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1

Introduction

Microfinance is the practice of originating small loans and capital infusions in developing
countries to poor individual families and small businesses that are outside traditional banks.
Today microfinance has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry that has stakeholders in the
financial services industry, private international organizations (including non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”)) and global politics. The successful initial public offering (“IPO”) of
SKS Microfinance, (“SKS”) a for-profit microfinance institution2 (“MFI”) in August 2010
marked the pinnacle of success for the theory that for-profit MFIs could eradicate poverty while
simultaneously making a huge profit through microfinance. The extremely successful SKS IPO
bolstered the idea that private industry and NGOs, not governments, should lead the effort to
eradicate global poverty with for-profit microfinance being the tool to help reach the almost three
billion unbanked people in the world and help further small-scale civil society and community
development. Scaling-up outreach to the many poor and underserved people had become a
primary goal in microfinance and for-profit MFIs such as SKS seemed poised to help achieve
that goal while simultaneously making large profits.

Events subsequent to the successful SKS IPO have intensified criticism of this theory and
have also highlighted another narrative regarding for-profit MFIs generally and microfinance in
India particularly: that for-profit MFIs, in an effort to sustain profits, have made irresponsible
investments and have abused the very poor communities in which these companies were
supposed to help eradicate poverty and encourage development. Since October 2010, the entire
Indian microfinance industry has come under scrutiny due to the growing suspicion of for-profit
MFIs and their actions in India. Andhra Pradesh, a state on India’s eastern coast which has more
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borrowers than any other state in India, is facing a microfinance credit crisis, because of a severe
decline in the recent level of repayment of MFI loans. According to the international press, the
situation in Andhra Pradesh is threatening to become the Indian equivalent of the 2007-2008
American subprime crisis.3 Many international news sources, including the Wall Street Journal,
Times of India, and the New York Times have published accusatory articles linking the rise of
for-profit MFIs to a microfinance loan crisis in Andhra Pradesh, and suicides and community
banishments.4 In response to these allegations, the Andhra Pradesh state government rolled out
An Ordinance to Protect the Women Self Groups from Exploitation by the Micro Finance
Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh and for the matters connected therewith or incidental
therefor, which soon after became a law of the same name (“MFI Bill”), which regulated the
lending practices of MFIs in Andhra Pradesh.5 While government regulation is an important and
necessary element in correcting the damage, the MFI Bill, as it stands today, has serious
limitations in its approach to the microfinance situation in Andhra Pradesh and does not
adequately address the situation. The MFI Bill’s largest drawback is that it only regulates the
conduct and actions of MFIs and does not attempt to regulate the Self Help Groups, (“SHGs”) or
any other type of microfinance organization operating in India.6 Part of the MFI Bill’s
overlooking of SHGs is because they are promoted by the Indian government and national
banking system and recently have experienced intense competition in total percentage of loan
disbursement from for-profit MFIs. Consequently, the MFI Bill, with its specific targeting of
for-profit MFIs does not provide adequate regulation of microfinance organizations.

For-profit MFIs, such as SKS, are not the sole cause for the microfinance crisis and the
MFI Bill is not a panacea that will cure microfinance abuses in Andhra Pradesh. Instead, the
microfinance community in Andhra Pradesh state would greatly benefit from (in addition to
3

government regulation) a legal accountability system that relies on “public accountability,
transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and civil society to initiate and
share substantive action.”7

Regulating the microcredit companies while still allowing them to function and grow as
private enterprises poses an important new challenge for government authorities, the financial
industry, broader civil society, and other stakeholders. This discussion is necessary and
extremely timely given the Andhra Pradesh situation and the ensuing rush by the media and local
government to blindly condemn for-profit MFIs. The emergence of new vehicles for delivering
financing to inhabitants of developing countries is part of the fragmentation and realignment of
the institutional landscape of foreign aid8 as well as part of the landscapes of international law
and corporate social responsibility.9 Devising an appropriate framework to encourage the
microfinance sector’s growth potential, while ensuring financial stability, sufficient
governmental control, and on-the ground solutions for local stakeholders is necessary. This
framework must address the growing role of private companies, particularly the financial
services industry and NGOs in the day-to-day operations, while also still engaging state and local
government and affording them opportunities to regulate and protect its citizens. Such a solution
I believe is best articulated through the United Nations (UN) Global Compact and Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) John Ruggie’s Protect, Respect, Remedy10
framework.

The UN Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed
to aligning their operations and strategies with universally accepted principles in the area of
human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. 11 I believe that it is this framework that
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best articulates the collaborative nature and social enterprise elements of microfinance as the
Global Compact is the expression of a global wish for companies to assume global
responsibility.12 The UN Global Compact recognizes and promotes the right to
development,13which is a central human right at issue Andhra Pradesh. Additionally, the UN
Global Compact SRSG Protect Respect Remedy framework best envisions the corporate
engagement that is needed to reform the microfinance industry in Andhra Pradesh.

This paper examines (1) in the history of microfinance generally and India as well as a
brief history of SKS; (2) the two main types of microfinance organizations in India, MFIs and
SHGs and the competition between SHGs and MFIs and its effect on the MFI Bill; (3) an
evaluation of the MFI Bill; (4) an evaluation of the UN Global Compact Protect Respect Remedy
Framework as a possible methodology that would improve the Indian microfinance industry.

I.

Microfinance Evolution and Application
a.

Microfinance Origins and Ideals

Microfinance, the concept of lending small amounts of money to impoverished and ignored
community members in developing nations,14 developed as a means for poor people to gain
access to basic financial services because traditionally the banking sector deprived these people
of access to credit. Mohammad Yunus, who received the Nobel Prize in 2006 for his work in
pioneering microfinance, described the role of microfinance in poverty alleviation (in contrast
with traditional charitable donations) as follows:
“[Microcredit] is based on the premise that the poor have
skills which remain unutilized or underutilized. It is
definitely not the lack of skills, which make poor people. . .
5

charity is not the answer to poverty. It [charity] only helps
poverty to continue. It [charity] creates dependency and takes
away the individual's initiative to break through the wall
of poverty. Unleashing of energy and creativity [via
microfinance] in each human being is the answer to poverty.”15
Yunus’s vision of microfinance was largely focused on lending to rural communities in agrarian
projects and other types of directed credit programs which would later be expanded to include
more urban community project and different types of enterprises. His contribution and influence
upon microfinance cannot be underestimated.

b. 1980s-1990s: Transition to Financial Systems Microfinance Approach
Through the 1990s, the policy of targeted subsidized rural credit that was initiated in the late
1970s, came under a slow but increasing attack as evidence mounted of the disappointing
performance of directed credit programs: namely poor loan recovery, high administrative costs,
agricultural development bank insolvency, and the accrual of a disproportionate share of the
benefits of subsidized credit going to larger commercial-style farmers.16 The basic tenets
underlying the traditional directed credit approach were debunked and supplanted by a new
school of thought called the "financial systems approach," which viewed credit not as a
productive input necessary for agricultural development but as just one type of financial service
tool that should be freely priced to guarantee its permanent supply and eliminate rationing.17
Meanwhile, microcredit programs throughout the world improved upon the original
microfinance methodologies and their findings defied conventional wisdom about financing the
poor. First, the new programs success showed that poor people, especially women, had excellent
6

repayment rates among the better-designed and implemented programs, repayment rates that
were better than the formal financial sectors of most developing countries.18 Second, the poor
people who participated in microcredit plans were willing and able to pay interest rates that
allowed MFIs to cover their costs.19
One reason for the improved repayment rates was because of the new factors that the NGOs
began to employ in determining credit-worthiness and encouraging repayment.20 Because their
clients did not possess traditional loan factors such as collateral, microfinance organizations
issued loans that were often only given for entrepreneurial activities and decisions to lend were
based on personal characteristics and cyclical business cash flow instead of aggregate business
capital and holdings or personal capital.21 To determine reliability, microfinance organizations
and other NGOs would interview family neighbors and business contacts.22 To encourage
repayment the microfinance organizations would reward reliable clients with larger loans at
lower interest rates and involve the community with the loan process.23 The particular loan
vetting factors of personal and community knowledge helped to permit growth and eliminate
some of the externalities faced by the directed credit approach of the 1960s and 1970s.
High repayment and cost-recovery interest rates permitted some MFIs to achieve longterm sustainability and reach large numbers of clients. Accordingly, in the 1990s there was
growing enthusiasm for promoting microfinance as a sustainable strategy for poverty alleviation
in developing nations worldwide. The microfinance sector blossomed in many countries and
world regions, eventually leading to many financial services firms serving the needs of
individual entrepreneurs and household businesses.
The success of microfinance organizations in the 1990s led to the theory of deriving
profits from microfinance industry and the subsequent privatization of NGOs and microfinance
7

organizations in an attempt to harness these profits. Commercial banks began paying serious
attention to microfinance, realizing that they could likely make a profit.24 The growth of
microfinance saw many microfinance NGOs transform into professional financial institutions
which specialized in microfinance loans and financial products.25 Since the 1990s, foundations,
venture capitalists, and the World Bank have used India as a petri dish for similar for-profit
social enterprises which sought to make profits while filling a social need.26 India was a logical
choice for this type of microfinance experimentation because of its proximity to the origin of
microfinance (Mohammed Yunus in Pakistan), India’s large and diverse population, and the
large English speaking segment of its population.
c.

Indian Microfinance and the Evolution of SKS Microfinance

In India and Pakistan there is a modern history of independent microfinance, which was
initially in the form of cooperative bank lending.27 In some cases, these informal networks were
groups of friends and neighbors, where the role of lender and borrower were interchangeable. 28
In other circumstances, individuals relied on local moneylenders who would offer small loans on
flexible but exorbitant terms.29 Besides the early cooperative banks, the region was a test ground
for the Grameen Bank (led by Mohammed Yunus), an early lending experiment that proved
successful and later emerged as leading not-for-profit microfinance institution.30
SKS was founded by Vikram Akula in 1997 as an NGO.31 In 1998, SKS began
operations in Tumnoor Village in Medak district of Andhra Pradesh.32 SKS was initially backed
by famous investors like George Soros and Vinod Khosla, a co-founder of Sun Microsystems.33
In 2005, SKS transitioned from a non-profit microfinance organization into a for-profit MFI.34
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In 2008, SKS becomes the first MFI to receive an ISO 9001:2000 certification for its internal
audit department.35

SKS is one of the largest microfinance institutions in the world servicing around 6.8
million clients, who are comprised mostly of poor women living in rural areas.36 SKS is also one
of the fastest growing MFIs, with a compound annual growth rate of 165% since 2004 and
revenues and profits have grown at a rate close to 100% annually in recent years.37 SKS has a
loan portfolio that is estimated at a value of 43 billion rupees ($940 million).38

In August 2010, SKS became the second MFI (the first in South Asia) to go public by
listing its shares on a public stock market.39 SKS and its shareholders raised nearly $350 million
during the IPO.40 This year, Vikram Akula, chairman of SKS Microfinance, privately sold
shares worth about $13 million.41

In recent years SKS has demonstrated tremendous interest from the global financial
markets through capital raises and its recent IPO. In 2008, during the depths of the financial
crisis42, SKS was able to raise $75 million of new equity capital to expand its business.43 In
August 2010, SKS completed an IPO that from the global financial perspective was a great
success: it was 13 times oversubscribed, and the company's valuation reached the top of the offer
band price (which initially listed the value of the company at $1.5 billion), and the share price
rose 13% on its first day of trading and rose 29% within four weeks of the IPO. In the process,
SKS raised $348 million in fresh capital that, in theory, was supposed to help further grow the
business and allow SKS to serve more people with financial services and microcredit than it
reached before the IPO. 44
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The success of the SKS IPO garnered enthusiasm and hope in regards to for-profit MFIs.
Fueled by new capital, SKS, in theory, had more ability to scale-up the volume of its
microfinance services to poor customers in India. However, the SKS IPO also intensified
already festering competition among the other Indian microfinance organizations. Particularly,
the SHGs viewed the rapid ascension of for-profit MFIs such as SKS with great alarm.

II. Dominant Microfinance Organizations in India: SHGs and MFIs

a. Overview of Indian Microfinance Landscape

The number of individuals and small businesses seeking to get involved in Indian
microfinance has mushroomed and created a large and sometimes confusing variety of
organizations that are being used to channel the growing capital flows related to microfinance.45
Host states like India have had widely divergent regimes for chartering and regulating the new
microfinance-related institutions and often inadvertently erected insurmountable barriers to their
operation through chartering rules, licensing, and interest rate ceilings, and other types of
barriers.46 Some of the microfinance organizations work much like conventional charities and
not-for-profit NGOs: collecting and transmitting private donations from private recipients and
using these donations to advance development, including both private sector growth and
institutional reform.47 Other microfinance organizations work like conventional financial service
institutions: where creditors are investors with full expectations of getting their money back as
well as an additional return on their investment.48 However, some of the newest microfinance
organizations function as intermediaries and accordingly operate in a less well-defined space that
operates somewhere between the traditional domains of charities, development agencies, and
financial institutions.49
10

b. SHGs and MFIs: Contrasting and Competing Microfinance Organizations

Indian microfinance is dominated by two operational approaches: self-help groups (SHGs),
and microfinance institutions (MFIs). SHGs are organizational structures comprised of larger
groups of approximately 10-25 community members (predominately women) who save amongst
themselves and distribute their pooled savings as a group.50 SHGs offer a flexible approach
which is individually adapted to the local conditions of the various Indian states by the
participating SHG agencies.51 SHGs focus on the ability of people from the lowest classes
(scheduled castes) to form a group, meet regularly, pool their savings, lend to members, and
establish a documented track record of financial intermediation within the group.52 On the basis
of the financial track record and collective participation of the community, the SHGs are then
permitted to open savings accounts and obtain limited bank loans as informal entities,53 however
extensive credit lines to SHGs are critically limited, and are they are based on a certain multiple
of SHG members' savings accounts within banks.54 The SHG then lends the money it receives
from the banks to their members on terms and conditions autonomously decided by each SHG.55

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SHGs have been increasingly linked to Indian
commercial banks through the loans given (by the bank to the SHG). The SHG is responsible for
repaying the bank loan, sometimes directly to the bank, or sometimes through a separate “SHGpromoting institution.”56 While the cumulative savings of SHGs could serve as a low-cost source
of funds for lending, their potential for growth is frequently limited by the lack of aggregated
savings across SHGs.57

The structure and growth of SHG outreach has been facilitated and promoted by the Indian
government, namely the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)
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through the SHG-Bank Linkage Programme (“SBLP”)58 and the National Reserve Bank of
India.59 Commercial banks, regional rural banks, and cooperative banks primarily fund the
SBLP, and NABARD in turn re-finances the loans given by the bank.60 NABARD functions as
the prime refinancing agency and has created over 36,000 bank branches and primary
cooperatives providing deposit services and credit.61 NABARD, as of 2006, had worked with
over 3,100 governmental and NGO SHG facilitators.62

The National Reserve Bank of India provides political legitimacy to the SHG Indian network
system by adjusting and promoting a policy framework that encourages banking relations with
SHGs.63 According to NABARD, almost 3 million SHGs have been linked to nearly 500 banks
since the program inception, reaching over 11 million households across India.64 Despite the
extensive network, SHGs have not demonstrated: the operational self-sufficiency, the ability to
mobilize sustained financial resources; and the institutional capacity to run without government
support in India.65

Indian MFIs vary greatly in their organizational models and strategies: they range from
not-for-profit NGOs based on the Grameen Bank model, to for-profit entrepreneurial ventures
such as SKS, and they also include developmental NGOs that have transitioned from SHG
promotion to direct financial intermediation.66 Today there are over 1,000 Indian MFIs.67 MFIs
can be either for-profit or not-for-profit. They traditionally make loans to groups of at least five
people (a majority of whom are women) in “joint-liability groups”.68 MFIs give loans directly to
these groups, but are not allowed to accept deposits.69

SKS’s particular methodology involves lending to individual women utilizing five member
groups where groups serve as the ultimate guarantor for each member.70 SKS designed the
12

system with small weekly repayments corresponding to cash flows, and implemented the
compulsory group training (“CGT”) which is a four day process consisting of one hour sessions
that educate clients on SKS processes and procedures and the culture of credit discipline.71

c. Contrasts in MFI and SHG Growth and Organization: The Source of Competitive OverLending?
As of March 2007, SHGs and MFIs have together disbursed $3.7 billion in microloans in
India.72 While the SHG model provides the majority of disbursements, the MFI model has
demonstrated a higher growth rate in recent years.73 From 2003-2007, MFIs’ loan disbursement
share rose from 28% to 47% of all Indian microfinance loans, a value of $1.7 million.74 Despite
such growth, estimates suggest that the current supply of MFI microcredit amounted to only
about 7% of potential demand during the 2007-2008 year.75 However, a recent governmental
sector report states that the MFIs disbursed more microcredit funds than the SHGs during the
2008-2009 fiscal year.76

Lack of funds ear-marked for SHG formation and the erosion of enthusiasm by banks in
acquiring SHG customers are cited as the major reasons for the recent decline in SHG loan
disbursement.77 While for-profit MFIs frequently market their own products and services, most
Indian banks are not really convinced that financing groups like those created by SHGs makes
commercial sense and hence exhibit muted interest at best in the promotion of SHGs.78 The
reluctance of banks to promote SHGs and the recent decline of SHG loan disbursement
demonstrates the highly dependent nature of SHGs on the Indian banking and political systems.
In the SHG process, three different stakeholders (NGOs, banks, and state level
governments) have to come together to support the SHGs, and frequently the three-way
relationship is adversarial,79 with stakeholders having conflicting interests regarding SHG
13

growth. SHGs, because of their wide-organizational structure, have been challenged by
sustainability,80 whereas most MFIs focus singularly on scaling up microcredit operations and
secondarily create a sustainable legal structure and business model that promotes the goal of
scaling up credit to individuals.81 Because of this singular approach, MFIs (particularly forprofit MFIs) have been generally more attractive to international commercial capital.

Recently, for-profit MFIs made considerable inroads in many Indian states where there
are also extensive SHG networks.82 While for-profit MFIs are more attractive than SHGs
because of their extensive capital-backed outreach efforts, they carry their own risk of corruption
and conflicts of interest which are manifested in the intrinsic need to keep generating revenue to
sustain profits. The need to generate profits likely has encouraged for-profit MFI employees to
make irresponsible loans. Accordingly, it is no coincidence that the rise of for-profit MFIs in
Andhra Pradesh appears to have lead to aggressive competition between microfinance
organizations and may have ultimately caused or at least accelerated over-lending in the region.
An unhealthy competition brewed among for-profit MFIs and other microfinance groups. Some
MFIs pursued multiple lending and coercive recovery practices even more vigorously and at the
same time SHGs became began to compete with for-profit MFIs. These conditions led to the
creation of the MFI Bill.

III. Legal Remedies to the Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh

Having discussed background factors that led the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh,
I will now discuss possible legal remedies and examine two legal frameworks: (1) the existing
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state law of the Andhra Pradesh government; (2) the relevant international law, with a particular
focus on the Global Compact’s Protect Respect Remedy framework. The state law is selfexplanatory. Examining the situation through an international law framework, I will examine the
right to development, and the strengths and weaknesses of implementing a corporate social
responsibility framework such as the Global Compact’s Protect Respect Remedy framework.

a. Indian State Governmental Framework: The AP MFI Bill
On November 4, 2010, in response to the growing national concern, the Indian state cabinet
approved the MFI Bill.83 The MFI Bill replaces the Ordinance to Protect the Women Self
Groups from Exploitation by the Micro Finance Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh and
for the matters connected therewith or incidental therefor which was issued on October 15,
2010.84 The MFI Bill makes registration with the government mandatory for MFIs; failure to
register can result in imprisonment or monetary fines.85 Under the MFI Bill, MFIs must receive
prior approval from the registration authority in order to give additional loans to SHG members
that are already receiving bank-financed SHG loans.86 This particular aspect of the MFI Bill was
created to prevent multiple loans being given to one person without verification of the
individual’s repayment capacity.87

There are also extensive provisions within the MFI Bill which regulate the form and manner
of MFI loan repayment. Attempts to recover any MFI-based loan through coercion (by MFI
employees) will attract a three year jail term or a monetary fine.88 All MFIs are required to
suspend loan payment collections until they have registered with local authorities in every
village where they operate.89 Additionally, MFIs will have to specify the area of their
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operations, the rate of interest and their system of operation and recovery when they register with
the registration authority.90

b. Weakness of State Law Framework: MFI Bill Harms Microfinance Growth by Targeting
Only MFIs

There are some aspects of the MFI Bill that are legitimate regulatory efforts by the
Andhra Pradesh government to track microfinance loan holders and eliminate overlapping loans
issued to citizens by MFIs, SHGs and predatory lenders. Policies such as mandatory MFI
registration in every village (with the registration authority) showing a listing of interest rates
and loan recovery policies is a good idea and should be implemented to help relieve fraud and
help promote community awareness.

However, most of the regulations articulated in the MFI Bill target solely MFIs, which
makes the MFI Bill appear as if it was created to stop for-profit MFIs from competing with statesponsored SHGs, instead of mitigating the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh. Many of the
policies articulated in MFI Bill seem to give unfettered power to SHGs and even place SHGs in a
policing mode: for example, the registering authority may, upon receipt of a complaint by SHG,
cancel the registration of the MFI after assigning sufficient proof to the complaint.91 This
requirement seems to inspire competition between the two types of organizations. Many of the
regulations, such as the registration requirements are good ideas which should be required of all
microfinance organizations, not just MFIs, but in the end some of the good general regulatory
ideas are lost in the clearly anti-MFI, pro- SHG stance of the MFI Bill.
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The MFI Bill seeks to unreasonably control the availability, delivery process, and price of
MFI loans. MFIs, which have been considered instruments in realizing the goal of financial
inclusion (in part because of their singular focus of serving a segment of the world’s unbanked
population), were certainly bound to face regulation. However, the issue is whether the MFI Bill
is supportive and instructive of an industry that has emerged as a global frontrunner in
combining social and economic goals, or whether the MFI Bill, and any other similar MFItargeting government legislation will throttle the industry with unrealistic requirements.92 Critics
of the MFI Bill claim that it is just a means to cancel all MFI-financed loans and accordingly,
destroy the MFI industry for local politicians’ political benefit in the 2013 elections.93 While
MFIs and microfinance may need further regulation, possibly in the form of interest rate caps,
stronger criteria and diligence for disbursement, and less aggressive collections methods, what is
really required is regulations that protect the consumer community while simultaneously
ensuring continued growth and innovation in combining societal and community impact
objectives with commercial and corporate drive.94

The MFI Bill represents a state law approach and an attempt to solve the issue in a “topdown” manner by regulating the conduct of civil society, industry, and local communities. The
MFI Bill and other similar government-driven policies have led to poor governance frameworks
for MFIs. I believe the state law approach in the form of the MFI Bill is not a complete solution
to the problems facing the microfinance industry in Andhra Pradesh and the microfinance
industry generally. Because the entire concept of microfinance centers around the international
financial and development industries and NGOs working with local communities and local and
state governments to foster industry and development, I think a purely state regulatory approach
is inadequate. A better framework to address the diverse stakeholders and take into account the
17

socio-economic character of microfinance is the Global Compact’s Protect, Respect and Remedy
Framework, which is rooted in international law and modern corporate social responsibility
norms. The Global Compact’s Protect Respect Remedy framework is a better fit because it
recognizes the rights of local community and state governments, while attempting to impart
responsibilities on international financial and business industries, and NGOs.

c. International Framework: The Protect Respect and Remedy Framework
The international human rights law framework was built in the aftermath of the Second
World War on the premise that individuals had to be protected from public state power.95 States
were and still are perceived as the primary and perhaps sole direct duty-holders in the human
rights framework. Modern factors that have somewhat shifted the duty-holder role from states to
corporations include privatization and globalization but also more generally the overall increased
power and influence of corporations in our daily lives.96 Globalization and privatization have
altered the way we look at human rights and social responsibilities and may require a new vision
on human rights: a world vision that more fully accepts non-state actors as new duty-holders in
the promotion of human rights and development. Today, there are activists, investors, and
businesses who look at globalization and the rise of corporatism and human rights through this
lens. Among other things, globalization and corporatism has led to the adoption of various legal
principles and guidelines that offer non-binding standards for businesses worldwide. In addition
to the Global Compact,97 these include the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,98 the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises,99
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the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,100 the Global Reporting Initiative (G31)
Guidelines,101 and the Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) standards.102
The Global Compact, launched in 2000 by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan103 was
created as a values-based platform to promote institutional learning and included respect for
human rights among its ten principles applicable to corporations. 104 At the 1999 World
Economic Forum, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact. The Global
Compact was not envisioned as a regulatory instrument intended to police, enforce, or measure
the behavior of companies.

Instead, the Global Compact relies on “public accountability,

transparency, and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor, and civil society to initiate
and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the Global Compact is
based.”105 The international human rights community experienced difficulty implementing the
ideas of the Global Compact and engaging the corporate world on the necessity for universal
mandatory human rights standards: in 2003, the UN Commission for Human Rights adopted the
draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights (“the Norms”).106 The Norms were rejected by the global corporate world and
were not ultimately approved.107 Moving forward, the Global Compact drew many adherents
from industry leaders, but on a voluntary basis.108 As of 2006, over 2000 business had endorsed
the principles.109
SRSG Ruggie was appointed with a mandate to “identify and clarify” international
standards and policies, research the implications of concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere of
influence,” and submit views and recommendations to what is now the Human Rights
Council.110 The SRSG embraced an important doctrinal move in the application of human rights
to business by addressing who is and who is not a “subject” of international law. Increasingly,
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he noted corporations are recognized as “participants” at the international level, with the capacity
to bear some rights and some duties under international law.111
SRSG Ruggie identified five categories of norms, ranging from accepted international
law principles to voluntary standards. The two categories with the strongest international law
foundation were state duties to protect against corporate abuses and corporate responsibility for
international crimes prosecuted in domestic courts.

Other possible sources of norms were

corporate responsibility for certain human rights violations derived from general human rights
norms, soft law mechanisms, and self-regulation.112 The SRSG argued that just as the human
rights community has long urged a move “beyond voluntarism” in the area of business and
human rights, this must be accompanied by a willingness to look “beyond compliance.”113 In his
later reports this has become formalized as the distinction between the obligation of states to
protect human rights, and that of businesses to respect them.114

With the lessons and limitations of the Norms in mind, the SRSG adopted a pragmatic
approach to multinational corporations (“MNC”) obligations based on three pillars: the state’s
duty to protect its citizens, MNCs’ responsibility to respect human rights, and the need to ensure
effective access to remedies (“Protect, Respect, Remedy”).115 The framework embraced the
traditional view of states as the primary protector of human rights obligations and envisaged a
narrow role for MNCs limited to respecting human rights.116 In defining a company’s specific
responsibilities, the SRSG advocates a “due diligence” process that outlines “the steps a
company must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.”117
The Protect Respect Remedy framework was called by some in the international community the
most significant global document on business and human rights ever produced.118
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The Protect Respect and Remedy framework’s first principle addresses the international
human rights law framework, stating, that under international law states have a duty to protect
against human rights abuses by non-state actors, including by businesses affecting persons within
their territory or jurisdiction.119 This duty includes taking all necessary steps to protect against
such human rights abuse, including prevention of investigation and punishment for abuses as
well as providing access to redress.120

Identifying human rights is an essential step in the Protect Respect Remedy framework,
as it is necessary for the state to be aware of human rights in order in order to adequately protect
its citizens' access to that right. In the Andhra Pradesh microfinance situation, the right to
development is a human right at stake. The right to development is a recognized human right in
international law and is codified in the UN Commission on Human Rights,121 the Declaration on
the Right to Development122 and the Vienna Declaration.123
The Andhra Pradesh state government’s MFI Bill is a governmental effort to protect its
citizens’ right to development and is a regulatory tool aimed at protecting citizens. However, the
MFI Bill would be more effective in protecting the rights of Andhra Pradesh citizens if the
Andhra Pradesh government more clearly identified and promoted the right to development,
either in the MFI Bill itself or through other state legislation. Furthermore, state efforts at
protection of citizens’ rights need to be more consistent and uniform, targeting all microfinance
organizations not just MFIs.

The second principle in the Protect Respect Remedy framework emphasizes corporate
social responsibility as a means of protecting and preventing human rights abuses.124 This
second “respect” principle provides a baseline for corporate behavior. Particularly important is
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the distinction between the responsibilities of states and corporations. The expectation under the
Protect Respect Remedy framework is that companies will carry out “due diligence”125 to
demonstrate that they respect the full range of internationally-recognized human rights. The
“due diligence” steps are part of the management process of a company and include: establishing
a company human rights policy; conducting human rights impact assessments, (which can be
integrated into environmental and social impact assessments); integrating human rights policies
into everyday company practices; and tracking performance via monitoring and auditing.126
When carrying out due diligence companies should consider: (1) the country and context in
which their business activities take place and the human rights challenges that these particular
contexts may pose; (2) the human rights impacts of their own activities in that context; and (2)
whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities,
including the relationships with business partners and states.127

This principle is particularly instructive in the Andhra Pradesh microfinance situation.
MFIs, SHGs, and any other pertinent type of microfinance organization should be complying
with these types of due diligence activities. It is important to note that SKS is attempting to
carry out some of due diligence principles.128 SKS has on its website: a code of conduct,129
national law guidelines (the Royal Bank of India core values campaign for non-banking financial
companies (NBFC)),130 and compliance with the Royal Bank’s NBFC requirements.131 As
earlier mentioned, the SKS internal audit team is also in compliance with the ISO 9001.132 An
internationally recognized management system such as ISO is an excellent tool for all businesses
to use and a particularly good tool for businesses that are involved in extensive information and
retrieval processes supply chains such as loan repayment. SKS’s creation of a code of conduct
exemplifies the first level of due diligence, which is acknowledgment of issue and creation of a
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policy. However, there needs to be more compliance by SKS and on the part of all microfinance
organizations in Andhra Pradesh. Closely examining the second pillar of the Protect, Respect
Remedy framework we see the importance of due diligence and the importance it has in
corporate organization and approach.

The Protect Respect Remedy framework's third principle is the need for more effective
access to remedies.133 For states to successfully meet their duty to protect against their abuses of
non-state third parties, victims should have greater access to both judicial and non-judicial
remedies.134 Additionally, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights includes the
expectation that companies will provide means to address grievances from individuals or
communities, whether through company-level grievance mechanisms or participation in
industry-level arrangements.135

For the implementation of the last “remedy” principle, state and local government should
work with microfinance organizations to create access to legal and non-legal remedies. A good
first step is already articulated in the MFI Bill, which has an initial proposal to fast track court
cases (after appropriate consultation with the High Court) for the settlement of civil disputes
related to microfinance loans and abuses.136 While it is important for the state to provide judicial
access to remedies, microfinance organizations should also provide non-judicial solutions such
as complaint boards or consumer hotlines or community centers. Additionally, a public-private
partnership between the microfinance organizations and the state government to provide
mediation opportunities, where consumers can voice their grievances to microfinance officials
and be heard in front of trained mediators and arbitrators, who have the power to settle
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microfinance-related disputes would be a welcome means to increase community access to
effective remedies.

d. Weakness of International Law Framework: Protect Respect Remedy’s Lack of
Enforceability
It is important to note there are some obvious limitations to the Protect Respect Remedy
framework and its application to the Andhra Pradesh microfinance situation. Namely, questions
regarding enforceability and the conflicts between legitimate policy demands and legitimate
human rights demands exist in a voluntary evolving legal framework such as the Protect Respect
Remedy framework. The SRSG recognizes the importance of these issues, but does not seem to
address them in his Draft Guiding Principles. As the SRSG points out in paragraph 5 of his
Report, the protection of human rights is complicated by other legitimate policy demands coming
into play, including the need for investment, jobs, as well as access to markets, technology and
skills.137 Governments may often refrain from protecting human rights in fear of diminishing
jobs and loosing foreign direct investment.138 While these are real concerns, they should not
stand in the way of employing the Protect Respect Remedy framework to help delineate roles
and obligations in situations such as the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh. Rather, because
of its very recognition and acknowledgement of these issues, and the Protect Respect Remedy
framework can be used to help all pertinent stakeholders protect human rights.

IV. Conclusion

The conflict between human rights and economic development is at the heart of the
business and human rights debate. Even though the SRSG acknowledges the importance of the
dichotomy of legitimate policy demands, the framework lacks a vision of how these policy
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demands can be conciliated. However, the Protect Respect Remedy Framework can help to
improve microfinance regulation and help corporations promote the right to development in
Andhra Pradesh and similar communities. The Protect Respect Remedy Framework as it stands
today is an adaptive and flexible legal framework that allows for remedies that are both legal and
non-judicial and includes stakeholders from many different sectors of modern life such as civil
society, industry, and government.

Government leadership as well as credible organizational involvement is required if the
stakeholders from industry, government, and community are to be brought to common ground
from which concerted action can take place. The microfinance sector requires regulation which
will protect citizens’ rights and still encourage responsible microfinance growth. Institutional
stability and sustainability issues are best addressed by funding banks and equity investors.
Regulation should be government’s domain but it should be singular in its purpose of ensuring
that microfinance institutions, by intent and practice, are providers of responsible finance to
vulnerable people. Government should not use regulation to stymie the microfinance industry or
instill political elements into the microfinance industry. These changes taken together will build
confidence amongst stakeholders and improve microfinance lending in Andhra Pradesh.
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